The Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reports. However, questions have been raised as to the extent of substantive reform in the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Declaring that "The era of low standards and false profits is over," 1 President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law July 30, 2002, describing it as incorporating the "most far-reaching reforms of American business practices" since the Great Depression. 2 Congress passed the Act with unexpected swiftness, spurred by the public's seeming outrage over the evergrowing list of corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron, Adelphia, Tyco, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen. 3 The preamble of the Act states its purpose: "To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes."
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Major accounting, auditing, and corporate governance provisions in the Act require members of boards of directors serving on audit committees to be independent of management, mandate CEO and CFO certification of financial statements, impose criminal penalties for knowingly certifying financial reports that fail to comport with the requirements of the Act, and prohibit accounting firms from performing certain non-audit services for an audit client. The Act also establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, requires rotation of audit partners on a client every five years, and orders Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.)
reviews of a registrant's financial statement filings at least once every three years.
In this paper we estimate changes in shareholder wealth associated with the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (commonly referred to as "SOX") to infer the capital market's assessment of the Act's expected costs and benefits. 5 We examine stock price reactions to events surrounding SOX and investigate whether market reactions associated with the Act are related to the extent of (1) non-audit services provided by a firm's auditor, (2) audit committee member independence, and (3) earnings management. We focus on these factors because SOX seeks to enhance the independence of external auditors, strengthen the role of audit committees, and reduce earnings management. SOX is the most important legislation dealing with financial reporting practices in the United States since the passage of the S.E.C. Acts in the 1930s, and our research should be useful to legislators, regulators, and researchers in assessing its expected impact.
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A number of legal commentaries have analyzed the main provisions of SOX and argue the new criminal liability provisions criminalize very little conduct that was not already criminal under existing statutes. 7 Perino asserts that "as the political firestorm increased and the Dow Jones Average plunged, there was clearly a sense in Washington that Congress had to do something (anything) and do it fast," and that the legislation contains more rhetoric than corporate reform. 8 These legal analyses suggest that SOX may simply be a political response to the high profile cases of fraudulent financial reporting with no significant impact on publicly traded companies in general.
In contrast, Brickey argues that SOX expands statutory prohibitions against fraud and obstruction of justice, increases criminal penalties, and strengthens sentencing guidelines. 9 In addition, news reports indicate there was considerable opposition to the Act's reforms by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and four of the Big 5 public accounting firms. 10 Since lobbying is costly, we assume that affected parties will lobby only when they perceive the expected benefits of altering proposed legislation exceed the expected costs. The lobbying efforts of the largest public accounting firms suggest they anticipated the Act would significantly affect their own practices, although it is an open question whether such lobbying also suggests an expectation of a significant impact on their publicly traded clients.
If SOX contains substantive accounting, auditing, or corporate governance reforms that improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting, then we would expect the Act to have a significant impact on shareholder value. In particular, it should impact the shareholder value of firms that (1) extensively manage earnings, and (2) were otherwise less compliant with SOX before its enactment (i.e., had dependent audit committee members or acquired substantial nonaudit services from their external auditors) differently than the shareholder value of other firms.
On one hand, if SOX contains substantive reforms, then we would expect the financial reports of firms that extensively managed earnings or were less compliant with SOX before its enactment to show a greater improvement in accuracy and reliability vis-à-vis the financial reports of other firms. 11 This greater improvement in accuracy and reliability should lead to a greater reduction of information uncertainty and thus greater positive stock price effects for these 9 K. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, Washington U. Law Quarterly 81 (2003) . 10 Review and Outlook, Volcker's Andersen Triumph, Wall St. J., 11 SOX seeks to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting by enhancing the independence of audit committees and external auditors, which should restrict the extent of earnings management. abilities to increase their compensation). Further, managers acting in shareholders' best interests would be constrained in their ability to manage earnings to increase slack in debt covenant provisions or to lower income to avoid income tax costs. In addition, reporting constraints imposed by the Act could restrict managers' ability to communicate private information to investors through earnings. If the total of all such costs is greater for firms that extensively managed earnings or were less compliant with SOX vis-à-vis other firms, then we would expect these firms to experience more negative stock returns as a result of SOX.
To the extent the reforms in SOX result in meaningful differences in expected net benefits or costs, such disparities should be reflected in differing share price reactions to critical events surrounding the Act. While we expect the shareholder wealth effects to differ for more extensive earnings managers compared to other firms, and similarly for firms with less independent audit committees relative to firms with more independent audit committees, and for firms acquiring relatively more non-audit services from their external auditors vis-à-vis other firms, it is nonetheless difficult to know a priori the relative magnitude of the benefits and costs of SOX, and thus what the net shareholder wealth effects will be. 16 Furthermore, it is unclear a priori whether the disparities in net costs and benefits are of a sufficient magnitude to allow us to detect cross-sectional differences in stock returns.
Results from our univariate analysis of stock prices indicate positive and significant stock returns associated with events that resolved uncertainty about specific provisions included in the Act or were informative about its enforcement, consistent with investors expecting the provisions and enforcement of SOX to have a net beneficial effect. The results of our cross-sectional analysis suggest that the expected benefits were greater for shareholders of firms that had more extensively managed earnings in prior years, consistent with the market anticipating SOX to constrain earnings management and induce more transparent financial reporting. In addition, we find evidence consistent with investors expecting the Act to impose greater costs on firms with less independent audit committee members and on firms with relatively high levels of non-audit services acquired from their external auditors.
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We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In the next section we develop an event history of SOX. Section III describes our empirical methods, Section IV presents the results, and we conclude in Section V.
II. EVENT HISTORY OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
In this section we identify the events surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which we summarize in Table 1 . These events potentially affected the probability that SOX would become law and/or the extent of reform in the legislation were it to become law. 18 18 Assume a prior probability (pr) that legislation reforming financial reporting will become law, and a prior assessment of the expected impact (i.e., the magnitude effect, M) of the legislation should it become law. Market reaction to a SOX event will equal the sum of the following three components: (1) the change in the prior probability reform legislation will become law (∆pr) times the prior assessment of the magnitude effect of the law; (2) the change in the prior assessment of the magnitude effect of the law (∆M) times the prior probability the legislation will become law; and (3) the change in the prior probability the legislation will become law times the change in the prior assessment of the magnitude effect of the law; i.e., (∆pr)M + pr(∆M) + (∆pr)(∆M).
19 See note 4 supra. 
D. Summary of Event History
We discussed critical events in the SOX legislative process with former S.E.C. Chief Accountant Lynn Turner. He indicated that much of the content that was included in the Sarbanes bill had been discussed for a long while, but had lacked support in Congress. However, would form the core of the Act. The Conference Committee report was the first date in event D 3 , and it was followed in quick succession by Congress passing the bill, the president saying he would sign it, and by two events that were informative about the Act's enforcement: the S.E.C.'s announcement that it would list CEOs and CFOs unable to certify their companies' financial reports on its Web site, and the initial CEO and CFO certification filings. Hence, we believe events D 2 and D 3 represent the critical events in the SOX process and expect them to be associated with significant share price effects.
Researchers cannot know with certainty when the market learns about an event. Thus, we use event windows that include the trading day the event occurs and the following trading day if that is when the event was reported in the news.
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III. EMPIRICAL METHODS
The empirical analysis involves two main parts. First, we examine stock price changes associated with SOX events for our sample of firms. This is a univariate analysis that gauges market response to the events surrounding the Act. Second, we employ a multivariate approach to investigate whether market reactions associated with the Act are related to cross-sectional differences in the extent of earnings management, the independence of audit committees, or the relative extent of non-audit services performed by a firm's external auditor.
A. Univariate Stock Price Analysis
To estimate the average stock price reaction of our sample to the events surrounding SOX, we estimate portfolio average daily stock returns over each of the three event periods using the following time-series model: 
where: R t = average daily stock return of sample firms on date t; D i = dummy variable for the i th event, which takes a value of 1 for the event window surrounding event i, and 0 otherwise. We examine the three events summarized in Table 1 ; hence, i = 1, 2, 3.
That is, we estimate the average stock price effects over each of the three events: event D 1 , the 56 If an event was not reported in the news, we include only the day the event occurs. In event D 2 , we assume the Andersen trial outcome was unknown prior to Saturday, June 15, the day the jury rendered its verdict. In event D 3 , the deadline for CEO/CFO certifications was 5:00pm, 
B. Multivariate Analysis
The univariate analysis focuses on average stock price effects across all sample firms, and thus does not consider the possibility of differential market reactions with regard to the extent of earnings management, audit committee dependence, or non-audit services acquired 58 Contemporaneous market-level events unrelated to SOX could potentially confound the analysis. However, it is reasonable to assume that market-level events are just as likely to occur on event days as on non-event days, and thus it is unlikely that our statistical analysis will be affected by market-level events. Nevertheless, each of the authors independently reviewed all news items in the Wall Street Journal's "What's News" section (namely, "Business and Finance" and "World-Wide" news), focusing on macroeconomic and other news that potentially could induce market-wide effects. We found relatively few such news items on the event days, and none that reflected major news stories. Furthermore, in our multivariate analysis (discussed below), in which we investigate whether SOX events impact firms depending on the extent of earnings management, dependence of audit committees, or non-audit services, any contemporaneous events would have to differentially affect a specific set of firms relative to others (for example, earnings managers vis-à-vis non-earnings managers) to confound the analysis. Finally, we control for industry and other factors known to affect stock returns. 59 The standard deviation used in this analysis is based on the time-series regression estimated over 252 trading days with one observation (the portfolio return) for each date. Hence, the analysis does not suffer from cross-sectional correlation problems associated with event-and calendar-time clustering since we estimate the standard deviation of portfolio returns on a given event date. We also find that the autocorrelation of portfolio returns is insignificant.
from a firm's external auditor. In our multivariate analysis, we estimate the cross-sectional relation between event date stock returns and these factors, as well as other characteristics that can affect returns. More specifically, we estimate the following model for each event i:
(2) . 60 We define AUDDEP j as the ratio of non-independent audit committee members to total audit committee members as of the end of 2001, where a dependent audit committee member is one who was employed by or affiliated with the firm. Section 301 of SOX requires that all audit committee members be independent of management. NONAUDF j is the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid by firm j to its external auditor.
AbPMMJ3 j and RESTATE j capture two different aspects of earnings management. The former reflects the magnitude of (performance-adjusted) abnormal accruals averaged over the three previous years, and proxies for the extent to which firms have consistently reported large abnormal (or discretionary) accruals. RESTATE denotes whether a firm restated earnings in the previous 5½-year period, implying a public disclosure of an accounting error or irregularity.
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Panel A of Table 2 reports that 9.9 percent of our sample had earnings restatements, and Panel C indicates that AbPMMJ3 j and RESTATE j are uncorrelated.
60 General Accounting Office, Financial Statement Restatements: Trends, Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses, and Remaining Challenges, GAO-03-138 (2002) . 61 Most of the restatements in the G.A.O. study are for earnings overstatements.
We include several control variables in equation (2) for factors that can affect returns, specifically firm size (SIZE j ), defined as the natural logarithm of market value of equity, the book-to-market ratio (BM j ), and market-model beta (BETA j ). 62 We compute SIZE j and BM j as of the end of 2001, and estimate BETA j using a minimum of 60 daily stock returns from 2001. We also control for industry using two-digit SIC codes.
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OLS estimation of equation (2) can yield biased standard errors of the coefficient estimates if there is cross-sectional correlation and/or heteroscedasticity in the residuals across firms. Cross-sectional correlation is particularly likely in our setting because each event surrounding SOX affects all firms at the same time.
To address these problems we adopt the estimation procedure proposed by Sefcik and Thompson. 65 Their methodology accounts for cross-sectional correlation and heteroscedasticity, and produces unbiased estimates of both the coefficients and their standard errors. 66 The Appendix describes this methodology.
Performance-Adjusted Abnormal Accruals. We base one of our two earnings management variables on performance-matched modified Jones (PMMJ) model abnormal accruals. 67 Performance matching, based on industry membership and return on assets, is 62 We note, however, that the impact of these factors may be muted in short event windows. 63 Our review of news articles revealed several cases of industry-specific news, especially for telecom firms that occurred on some of the event dates. 64 In untabulated tests, we also include audit committee size, frequency of audit committee meetings, and stock ownership by the top five executives as additional control variables and the results remain the same. 
C. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
We include a firm in the empirical analysis if all of the following requirements are met. Analyst data, respectively, to compute AUDDEP and NONAUDF, as well as the necessary CRSP data. The final sample consists of 850 firms that have all of the required data. (AbPMMJ3) is 0.058, or 5.8 percent of total assets (median = 0.046). As noted, the sample frequency of earnings restatements is 9.9 percent (RESTATE). The mean proportion of non-independent audit committee members (AUDDEP) is 10.2 percent, and the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees paid to external auditors (NONAUDF)
ranges from zero to 98.5 percent, with a mean (median) of 56.6 percent (58.3 percent).
PLACE We report a correlation matrix in Table 2 and that the S.E.C would rigorously enforce at least some key provisions of the Act.
IV. RESULTS
A. Univariate Stock Price Analysis
We find no significant stock price effect associated with event D 1 , consistent with our expectation that the early events resolved little uncertainty about SOX. Stock price effects were also not significant for event D 2 . However, it is instructive to comment on the results for event Overall, the results of our univariate stock return analysis suggest the following. By July 17 th , the market expected reform legislation would be enacted, but did not expect such legislation to have a net positive impact on firms. Event D 3 changed investors' expectations about the extent and effectiveness of the reforms in SOX. Specifically, the significantly positive stock returns associated with the release of the Conference Committee report, the S.E.C.'s enhanced enforcement actions, and initial compliance with the CEO/CFO certifications suggest these events changed investors' expectations such that they began to anticipate that the law's provisions, and the enforcement thereof, would have a net beneficial effect, consistent with substantive reforms in financial reporting, auditing, and/or corporate governance practices. Table 4 presents results for our cross-sectional analysis using the Sefcik-Thompson estimation method. Consistent with the univariate results in Table 3 , we find significant effects associated with event D 3 that resolved uncertainty about the provisions of SOX and was informative about its enforcement. More specifically, the coefficient on AbPMMJ3 is positive and significant (0.040, t = 2.87) for event D 3 , suggesting that the market viewed the provisions and the enforcement of SOX as benefiting shareholders more, the more their firms had managed earnings in prior years. 72 Hence, these results are consistent with investors expecting SOX to constrain earnings management and enhance the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting of such firms. In contrast, the coefficient on RESTATE is not significant for event D 3 . 73 In addition, the coefficient on AUDDEP for event D 3 is significantly negative (-0.005, t = -1.98), which is consistent with the expectation that SOX would be more costly the greater the proportion of dependent audit committee members on a firm's audit committee. Finally, NONAUDF has a significant and negative coefficient for event D 3 (-0.005, t = -2.47) , consistent with the expectation that SOX would be more costly the greater the proportion of non-audit services (compared to total services) that firms acquire from their external auditors. Thus, SOX was expected to impose greater costs on firms that were less compliant with the audit committee and non-audit services provisions prior to SOX's enactment. We also note that SIZE has a 72 Untabulated results for individual components of event D 3 reveal a significantly positive coefficient on AbPMMJ3 (0.160, t = 4.53) for the issuance of the House-Senate Conference Committee report on July 24 th . This is the most significant result among the components of event D 3 and is consistent with the univariate results reported above. 73 Perhaps the act of restating earnings in prior years had forced these firms to improve the accuracy and reliability of their financial reports prior to the SOX legislation.
B. Multivariate Analysis
significantly positive coefficient for event D 3 (0.002, t = 2.06), suggesting that investors expected SOX to have a greater net beneficial effect for larger firms. These last two results reverse the negative effect associated with the WorldCom fraud announcement and are consistent with an increase in the probability that reform legislation would pass and be more beneficial for shareholders the more their firms had managed earnings in prior years. Hence, while the House and Senate had passed competing bills and uncertainty remained about which provisions would be included in a Conference Committee bill, the results suggest the market was expecting that reform legislation would be enacted and that its provisions likely would constrain earnings management.
PLACE TABLE 4 HERE
Overall, the results of the multivariate tests are consistent with the inference that investors viewed SOX as representing substantive reforms that would enhance the accuracy and reliability of financial reports, and that the beneficial effects were expected to be greater for shareholders of firms that had more extensively managed earnings in prior years. In addition, the market expected SOX to be more costly for firms that needed to adjust their corporate governance practices to eliminate dependent audit committee members and reduce non-audit services acquired from external auditors.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We identify critical events surrounding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and conduct an event study to infer the capital market's assessment of the Act's expected impact and investigate the impact cross-sectionally in terms of the extent of earnings management, dependent audit committee members, and non-audit services provided by external auditors.
In our univariate analysis, we find significantly positive stock returns associated with events that resolved uncertainty about which provisions would be included in the law and that were informative about enforcement of the law -specifically, the issuance of the House-Senate Conference Committee report on the final bill, the S.E.C.'s announcement of plans to publicly identify CEOs and CFOs who fail to certify their firms' financial reports, and initial compliance with the required CEO/CFO certifications. The results are consistent with investors expecting the provisions and enforcement of SOX to have a net beneficial effect. In our cross-sectional analysis, we find considerable evidence of a positive association between stock returns and the extent of earnings management, suggesting that investors expected SOX to constrain earnings management and to have a greater positive impact on firms that had managed earnings more extensively in prior years. We also find evidence consistent with SOX imposing more costs on firms having higher proportions of non-independent audit committee members and on firms whose external auditors provided relatively higher levels of non-audit services. Overall, the results are consistent with market participants anticipating that the provisions and enforcement of SOX would have a net beneficial effect by improving the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting.
day t (N is total number of firms), and p W ′ is a 1 x N vector of weights for portfolio p. 75 The weight vectors are from the following matrix:
where X is an N x P matrix and can be written as X = ( INDUSTRY, respectively). We then run the following regression, which regresses portfolio returns (from equation (A1) using weights from equation (A2)), for each portfolio using OLS: R t = average stock return across sample firms on date t; R jt = stock return for firm j on date t; D i = dummy variable for the i th event, which takes a value of 1 for the event window surrounding event i, and 0 otherwise; i = 1, 2, 3. over 1999 -2001, where PMMJ is Performancematched Modified Jones Model Abnormal Accruals. RESTATE = 1 if the company restated financial restatement in the G.A.O. sample and 0 otherwise. AUDDEP = Ratio of non-independent audit committee members to total audit committee members. NONAUDF = Proportion of non-audit fee to total fee paid to the external auditor. SIZE = Natural log of market value of equity. BM = Book-to-market ratio, computed as total book value of equity divided by MVE. BETA = Market-model beta computed based on 2001 daily stock returns. INDUSTRY = 41 industry dummy variables (results not tabled).
